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Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence:
The Voter's Perspective
LAWRENCE BAUM*
The relationship between judicial elections and judicial independence is
receiving considerable scrutiny today. This article examines the impact of
elections on judicial independence from the perspective of voters, since it is
voters' choices that ultimately determine the electoral fates of incumbent judges.
The research on voting in judicial elections helps in understanding the
circumstances that make judges vulnerable to defeat and the conditions under
which elections may reduce judicial independence. This research also
illuminates the effects of different forms of election-partisan, nonpartisan, and
retention-on incumbent judges.
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial independence is a subject of great interest today, and much of that
interest concerns its connection with judicial elections. There is a widespread
perception of growth in the frequency of strong challenges to incumbent judges
that are based on the substance of judges' decisions.' In turn, this perceived
growth suggests that the election of judges reduces judicial independence in
substantial ways.
Judicial independence raises important normative questions concerning the
balance between independence and accountability. 2 In this article I leave those
questions aside and focus instead on empirical issues concerning the relationship
between judicial elections and judicial independence. Most of the attention given
* Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University. In writing this article, I have
benefited from discussions with participants in the conference on which this Symposium Issue
is based.
1 See, e.g., DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
(2002), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASMoneyReport.pdf (last visited Dec.
12, 2002); William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal a New Era for State Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2000, at AI; Tom R. Phillips, When Money Talks, the Judiciary Must Balk,
WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2002, at B2. As I will discuss, this perception almost surely is accurate.
Yet issue-based campaigns against incumbents are hardly new. See, e.g., Jack Ladinsky &
Allan Silver, Popular Democracy and Judicial Independence: Electorate and Elite Reactions
to Two Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 128, 129-30; Champion of
Integration Loses in L.A., S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1970, at 5 (California Superior Court); Steven
Wittels, Running for Judge, AM. LAW., Sept. 1982, at 32, 32-33 (California Superior Court).
2 These topics are discussed in other articles in this issue. See also PETER H. RUSSELL &
DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (2001). An extensive annotated bibliography is
found in Amy B. Atchison et al., Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: A
Selected Bibliography, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 723 (1999).
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to this relationship focuses on campaigns for judicial office, with particular
attention to the issues that candidates raise and the levels and sources of
campaign funding. But ultimately it is voters who determine the outcomes of
contests for judgeships and thus the impact of elections on judicial independence.
There are large gaps in our understanding of voting in judicial elections.
Over the years, however, scholars have done considerable research on patterns of
voting and outcomes in judicial elections. The debates and analyses concerning
the relationship between elections and judicial independence have incorporated
that research only to a limited degree.3 This article is intended to bring that body
of knowledge into those debates.4
The second section of the article briefly addresses some preliminary issues.
The third section surveys what we know about the behavior of voters in judicial
elections. The fourth section examines the circumstances under which
incumbents are defeated in elections. The fifth section draws out the implications
of the empirical evidence for issues concerning judicial independence.
II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Judicial independence has been defined in a variety of ways. 5 For purposes
of this article, full judicial independence is defined as a condition in which
judges are entirely free from negative consequences for their decisions on the
bench. The degree ofjudicial independence is the degree of such freedom.
Negative consequences for decisions might take many forms. The most
obvious, and the focus of this article, is loss of position. In practice, judges' fears
3 This situation reflects the limited communication between scholars in law and those in
the social sciences, which results in what Professor Frank Cross has called "unfortunate
interdisciplinary ignorance." Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 251 (1997); see also
Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 511-12 (1998). Specifically,
empirical research on judicial elections is done primarily by political scientists; legal scholars
and others in the legal community do not generally consult political science journals.
4 1 draw evidence in part from a series of surveys of Ohio voters in state supreme court
contests over the past two decades. Surveys of voters in contests for offices other than the
highest ones are relatively rare, so this set of surveys has added substantially to the body of
knowledge on judicial voting. The Ohio surveys and some of the difficulties involved in
surveys of judicial voters are discussed in Lawrence Baum, Electing Judges, in
CONTEMPLATING COURTS 18, 31 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
5 For a discussion of different aspects of judicial independence, see Martin H. Redish,
Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV.
697, 706-12 (1995). See also JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
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of losing their positions may be exaggerated, as is often the case for legislators.6
Such exaggerated fears can have a direct impact on judges' behavior, but my
primary concern is the actual vulnerability of judges to defeat rather than judges'
perceptions of their vulnerability.
Elections, of course, are not the only potential source of limits on judicial
independence. For one thing, loss of position is not the only significant
consequence that judges may suffer for their decisions. Life-tenured federal
judges have been subjected to severe personal criticism and even threats of
violence as a result of their decisions, as some district judges were during the
battles over civil rights in the Deep South.
7
Further, judges who do not face elections can still lose their positions as a
result of their decisions. State judges have been denied reappointment by the
governor because of their decisions, although the reasons for the denial are not
always clear. Some observers perceived that Delaware's governor denied a new
term to a supreme court justice in 1994 because the justice had taken positions
favorable to stockholders in conflicts with corporate management. 8 In 1997, New
York Governor George Pataki reportedly decided not to reappoint an appellate
judge on the ground that the judge had shown excessive liberalism in criminal
cases.
9
Even a life term does not guarantee continued tenure. In 2000, Chief Justice
David Brock of the New Hampshire Supreme Court was impeached (though not
convicted) for alleged misdeeds concerning court procedures.' 0 Those
allegations probably would not have resulted in legislative action had it not been
for widespread unhappiness about the state supreme court's decisions concerning
6 See THOMAS E. MANN, UNSAFE AT ANY MARGIN: INTERPRETING CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS 3 (1978); GLENN R. PARKER, HOMEWARD BOUND: EXPLAINING CHANGES IN
CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR 22 (1986).
7 See generally J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES
AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: J.
WATIES WARING AND CIVIL RIGHTS 98-106 (1987); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDGE FRANK
JOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA 47-61 (1981).
8 The justice, Andrew Moore, was left off of a one-person "list" of nominees presented to
the Governor by a nominating commission, and the Governor appointed that nominee. See
Karen Donovan, Shareholders' Advocates Protest Justice's Removal, NAT'L L.J., June 6, 1994,
at B 1; Diana B. Henriques, Top Business Court Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1995, at D1;
Richard B. Schmitt, Delaware Governor Picks Trial Judge for Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.,
May 26, 1994, at B7.
9 Jan Hoffman, A Prominent Judge Retires, Objecting to the Governor's Litmus Test,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, § I (Metro), at 49.
10 See Ralph Ranalli, N.H. Senate Acquits State's Chief Justice, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11,
2000, at A1; Ralph Ranalli, Personality Seen Factor in N.H. Drama, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12,
2000, at B 1; Jeffrey Toobin, The Judge Hunter, NEW YORKER, June 12, 2000, at 49, 49-54.
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school funding. The court had declared that the state's funding system was
unconstitutionalII and then disapproved some proposed changes in the system. 2
No federal judge has been removed because of the substance of the judge's
decisions, 13 but in recent years some have been threatened with impeachment for
that reason. In the mid-1990s, House Majority Whip Tom DeLay talked of
seeking to impeach some federal judges whom he regarded as excessively
liberal.14 New York district judge Harold Baer was strongly attacked for his
decision and opinion throwing out evidence in a 1996 drug case. Republicans in
Congress advocated his impeachment, and President Clinton's press secretary
suggested that the President might ask his appointee Baer to resign. Under this
pressure, Judge Baer reversed his decision. 15
Still, the attention given to the impact of elections on judicial independence
is justified. The great majority of judges in the United States must periodically
win elections in order to retain their positions, 16 and significant numbers of
incumbent judges are defeated. Changes in campaign practices almost surely
have increased the number of judges who face opposition based on the content of
their decisions. Whether or not the proportion of judges who are actually
11 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.H. 1997).
12 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 744 A.2d 1107, 1108-09 (N.H. 1999).
13 See MARY VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT: NONE CALLED FOR JUSTICE 1-20
(1993). However, the impeachment of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in 1804 was
largely a result of President Jefferson's unhappiness with Chase's decisions. Chase's
impeachment and acquittal are discussed in WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE
HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 15-
119(1992).
14 Bruce Fein, Judge Not, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1997, at A3 1.
15 Don Van Natta Jr., A Publicized Drug Courier Pleads Guilty to 3 Felonies, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1996, at A23. The decisions were United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) and United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
The unsuccessful campaign to impeach Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas in
1969 and 1970 was spurred in part by conservative unhappiness with Douglas's decisional
record. JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 391-411
(1980). The same was true of the drive to impeach Justice Abe Fortas in 1969, though Fortas
was charged with more serious improprieties than Douglas was. Fortas actually might have
been impeached and convicted had he not resigned from the Supreme Court. LAURA KALMAN,
ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 359-78 (1990).
16 Justices on the highest appellate courts of thirty-eight states and judges on the trial
courts of general jurisdiction in thirty-nine states face elections. These figures were calculated
from data in AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE
AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2000). According to one scholar's calculation, 87% of
state judges "stand for some form of election." Roy Schotland, Judicial Campaign Finance
Could Work, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 23, 1998, at A21.
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defeated has increased, 17 the growth in issue-based campaigns against
incumbents probably has increased the proportion who are defeated on the basis
of their decisions. If so, the independence of elected judges, by my definition, has
declined.
Among the states that elect judges, the ballot takes three general forms, each
used by several states.1 8 In some states, candidates' party affiliations are listed on
the general election ballot. In those states, candidates typically are nominated in
partisan primary elections. In other states, candidates' partisan affiliations are not
listed on the general election ballot. Nominations usually are made in nonpartisan
primary elections, which become the final elections if a candidate receives a
majority of the votes. In retention elections, voters are asked to cast positive or
negative votes on sitting judges, with a simple majority of positive votes usually
required for retention. 19
These three ballot forms largely correspond to three election systems-
respectively, partisan election, nonpartisan election, and the Missouri Plan (or
merit selection). But the correspondence is imperfect because some states meld
features of different systems. Ohio, for instance, utilizes partisan primary
elections and nonpartisan general elections.20 California initially chooses
17 Because we lack comprehensive data on the outcomes of judicial elections, it is
uncertain whether the rate of defeat has increased over the past quarter-century. However, two
studies suggest that such an increase has not occurred. One study of all elections to state
supreme courts between 1980 and 1994 showed no clear trend toward higher rates of defeat
during that period. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy:
Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315, 319 (2001). A study of
retention elections in ten states between 1964 and 1994 showed no trend toward an increasing
number of defeats. Larry Aspin et al., Thirty Years of Judicial Retention Elections: An Update,
37 SOC. SCI. J. 1, 9-10 (2000). It is possible that the rate of defeat has increased in the years
since the 1994 ending point of these studies, a period in which strong challenges to incumbent
judges seem to have grown. See Glaberson, supra note 1; cf GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note I
(describing the recent trend of interest group activity in state judicial elections).
18 For their highest appellate court, five states use partisan elections for incumbent judges,
fourteen use nonpartisan elections, and nineteen use retention elections. For their general
jurisdiction courts, nine states use partisan elections, twenty-two states use nonpartisan
elections, and thirteen use retention elections. These figures add up to more than the total
number of states that elect judges to general jurisdiction courts, provided supra note 16,
because four states use different systems for different general jurisdiction courts. Mixed and
ambiguous procedures were classified according to the system that they most closely
approximate. State procedures were classified on the basis of information in AMERICAN
JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 16.
19 Illinois is the exception, requiring a 60% positive vote for retention. ILL. CONST. art. 6,
§ 12(d) (1993). The impact of that difference is discussed in the text herein. See infra text
accompanying note 66.
20 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § § 3505.04, 3513.13 (Anderson 1995).
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appellate judges through gubernatorial appointment but requires appointees to
undergo periodic retention elections. 21 Illinois combines initial selection through
partisan elections with retention elections for sitting judges.22
Mixed systems aside, the extent and form of differences in actual practice
among the three election systems are not necessarily as substantial as their formal
rules would suggest. Judicial selection methods that appear to be fundamentally
different may operate similarly in important respects.23 One issue to be
considered in this article is the actual differences among partisan election,
nonpartisan election, and the Missouri Plan, including their implications for
judicial independence.
III. THE JUDICIAL VOTER
One useful way to think about voters is that they are people who process
information in light of their attitudes and beliefs in order to reach decisions.24
This perspective underlines the importance of the information that candidates'
campaigns and the mass media provide to prospective voters. It also emphasizes
that the voters do not receive information as blank slates; rather, they evaluate
from their own perspectives the information they receive.
Research on voting behavior concentrates overwhelmingly on contests for
high-level offices and primarily on presidential elections. 25 This focus is
understandable, but it distorts our picture of voters' decisions. Presidential
elections are unique in the volume of information about the candidates that voters
21 CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 16(d) (1996).
22 ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 12(a),(d) (1993).
23 One important similarity across the three elective systems is that each gives
considerable power to the chief executive. The Missouri Plan allows the governor to select a
judge from the nominees, and the governor's power to choose some members of the
nominating commission provides another source of influence. See Beth M. Henschen et al.,
Judicial Nominating Commissioners: A National Profile, 73 JUDICATURE 328, 334 (1990);
Editorial, Mr. Pataki Picks a Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1996, at A28. In states that use
partisan or nonpartisan elections, typically a substantial proportion of judges reach the bench
initially through a governor's interim appointment. The proportion was about one-half in a
study of eleven states. John Gibeaut, Bench Battle, A.B.A. J. Aug. 2000, at 42, 43. Of course,
this characteristic of the three elective systems also reduces the differences between them and
the system of gubernatorial appointment.
24 See INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES (John A. Ferejohn & James H.
Kuklinski eds., 1990) (discussing the role of information in elections and more generally in
political decisionmaking).
2 5 See generally CLASSICS IN VOTING BEHAVIOR (Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F.
Weisberg eds., 1993); CONTROVERSIES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR (Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F.
Weisberg eds., 4th ed. 2001).
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possess when they go to the polls.26 The task for many voters is one of sorting
out the information they have assimilated in order to reach a judgment about how
to vote. For this reason, presidential election contests can be characterized as
"high-information."
The preponderance of electoral contests in this country are fundamentally
different from presidential elections in that voters have little information about
the choices they face. In the great majority of contests, a large share of the voters
go to their polling place without having assimilated much (or any) information
about these contests. Indeed, many voters are not aware that these contests exist
until they see the ballot. Ordinarily, contests for judgeships fall firmly in this
"low-information" category.27
Low-information contests are usually on the same ballot as more visible
contests in which voters have been supplied with more substantial information.28
It is predominately those high-information contests that attract voters to the polls.
After casting their votes for offices such as president or U.S. senator, voters are
then confronted with a set of low-information contests.
In the typical contest between two candidates, the voter has three options: a
vote for the first candidate, a vote for the second candidate, or abstention. The
choice in retention elections is similar: a yes vote, a no vote, or abstention. Voters
who feel that they have no basis for a choice between the candidates are likely to
abstain. Such abstentions are common, producing "rolloff' from high levels of
participation in the contests at the top of the ballot to substantially lower levels in
other contests. 29 Rolloff is an enduring reality in judicial elections. From 1980
through 1995, an average of about one-quarter of all people who went to the polls
skipped a given contest for a supreme court seat. Rolloff was somewhat lower in
26 Differences among offices in the information available to the voters are analyzed in
Lawrence Baum, Information and Party Voting in "Semipartisan" Judicial Elections, 9 POL.
BEHAV. 62 (1987); Barbara Hinckley et al., Information and the Vote: A Comparative Election
Study, 2 AM. POL. Q. 131 (1974); Stephen D. Shaffer, Voting in Four Elective Offices: A
Comparative Analysis, 10 AM. POL. Q. 5 (1982).
27 Gary C. Byrne & J. Kristian Pueschel, But Who Should I Vote forfor County Coroner?,
36 J. POL. 778 (1974); John E. Mueller, Choosing Among 133 Candidates, 34 PUB. OPINION Q.
395 (1970); Masao Nakanishi et al., Voting for a Political Candidate Under Conditions of
Minimal Information, I J. CONSUMER RES. 36 (1974).
28 Wisconsin, which has separate election dates for nonpartisan offices (including
judgeships), is an exception. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 5.58 (West 1996).
29 R. Darcy & Anne Schneider, Confusing Ballots, Roll-Off, and the Black Vote, 42 W.
PO. Q. 347 (1989); John T. Pothier, Drop-Off, the Vanishing Voters in On-Year Elections, and
the Incumbency Advantage, 15 AM. POL. Q. 123 (1987); Jack L. Walker, Ballot Forms and
Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the Office Block and Party Column Ballots, 10 MIDWEST J. POL.
SCI. 448 (1966); Martin P. Wattenberg et al., How Voting Is Like Taking an SAT Test: An
Analysis ofAmerican Voter Rolloff, 28 AM. POL. Q. 234 (2000).
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partisan elections (an average of 22%) than in nonpartisan elections (29%) and
retention elections (28%).30 As we would expect, rolloff is even higher in
contests for lower-level judgeships. For instance, for all retention elections in ten
states between 1964 and 1994, rolloff averaged 34.5%. 31
Despite these high levels of rolloff, voters as a group appear to have a bias in
favor of casting votes. Even a modicum of information about the candidates may
be sufficient for a voter to choose one of them.32 Thus the subset of voters who
participate in a judicial contest may include a great many who possess little
information about the candidates in that contest.
Indeed, surveys often show that high proportions of voters cannot recall the
names of judicial candidates around the time of the election. 33 Recollection of
candidates' names is a difficult cognitive test (compared with recognizing those
names when presented with them), and the results of such tests surely
underestimate voters' information levels. However, surveys in Ohio Supreme
Court contests have found that substantial proportions of the people who vote in
those contests do not recognize the candidates' names, and many of those who
do recognize those names have insufficient information to rate the candidates. 34
30 Melinda Gann Hall, Ballot Roll-Off in Judicial Elections: Contextual and Institutional
Influences on Voter Participation in the American States, at 18 tbl.1, Sept. 2, 1999 (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Atlanta, Sept.
2-5, 1999) (on file with author). Turnout and rolloff in supreme court elections from 1948
through 1974 are discussed in Philip L. Dubois, Voter Turnout in State Judicial Elections: An
Analysis of the Tail on the Electoral Kite, 41 J. POL. 865 (1979).
31 Aspin et al., supra note 17, at 12.
32 The ballot itself may strengthen the impulse to participate. One example is the ballot on
an electronic voting machine on which a light flashes above each contest if the voter has not yet
chosen a candidate in that contest. A study in Franklin County (Columbus), Ohio compared
wards in which these machines were used with wards in which more traditional voting
machines were used. In contests for judgeships, even more than in other contests on average,
the flashing light induced voters to make choices. (One reason for the stronger effect in judicial
contests undoubtedly was the lack of party labels on the ballot for judicial candidates.) The
difference in voting rates between polling places with flashing lights and those without them
averaged twelve percentage points for supreme court contests, sixteen percentage points for the
court of appeals, and fifteen percentage points for the trial court of general jurisdiction. Stephen
M. Nichols & Gregory A. Strizek, Electronic Voting Machines and Ballot Roll-Off, 23 AM.
POL. Q. 300, 308 (1995).
33 See, e.g., How Much Do Voters Know or Care About Judicial Candidates?, 38
JUDICATURE 141, 141-43 (1955) (parts of New York State, 1954); Charles A. Johnson et al.,
The Salience of Judicial Candidates and Elections, 59 SOC. SCI. Q. 371, 374-75 (1978)
(Lubbock, Texas, 1974).
34 Lawrence Baum, Voters' Information in Judicial Contests: The 1986 Contests for the
Ohio Supreme Court, 77 KY. L.J. 645, 664-65 (1988-89); Baum, supra note 4, at 31; see also
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In a low-information contest, the ballot itself is the primary source of
information about the candidates. 35 Of course, it informs voters of the
candidates' names. Several states provide the candidates' party affiliations in
general elections; this, of course, is the definition of partisan elections.3 6 A few
states identify the incumbent, if one is running,37 and Kansas and West Virginia
provide the candidates' cities or counties of residence.38
Names on the ballot can trigger evaluations of candidates. Sometimes these
evaluations are based on pre-existing impressions. A voter may have forgotten
that a particular pair of candidates was running for a judgeship; perhaps the voter
Anthony Champagne & Greg Thielemann, Awareness of Trial Court Judges, 74 JUDICATURE
271 (1991) (discussing voters' knowledge of the office held by named judges).
35 The structure of the ballot itself can also influence voters' choices. Features such as the
option to cast a single "straight-ticket" vote for all candidates of the same party encourage
party-line voting. See Philip Loring Allen, Ballot Laws and Their Workings, 21 POL. SCI. Q.
38, 44-49 (1906); Jerrold G. Rusk, The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform in Split-Ticket
Voting: 1876-1908, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1220 (1970). Further, the order of candidates'
names on the ballot can influence voters in low-information contests, with the first-listed
candidate generally gaining an advantage. See D. Brook & G. J. G. Upton, Biases in Local
Government Elections Due to Position on the Ballot Paper, 23 APPLIED STAT. 414 (1974);
Joanne M. Miller & Jon A. Krosnick, The Impact of Candidate Name Order on Election
Outcomes, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 291, 315-20 (1998). But see R. Darcy, Positions Effects in
Multimember Districts: The New Hampshire House of Representatives, 1972-1994, 30 POLITY
691, 703 (1998) (arguing that first position on the ballot does not lead to electoral advantage).
One commentary noted that in the hard-fought contests for seats on the Mississippi Supreme
Court in 2000, the candidate listed first on the ballot won in each contest, and it suggested that
this fact explained the results. See generally Michael P. Mills & Lee Waddle, Judicial
Independence in Mississippi, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 709, 727 (2001).
36 In supreme court contests involving incumbents, five states indicate the candidates'
party affiliations; in contests for the court of general jurisdiction, nine states provide this
information. See supra note 18.
The discussion of voting in partisan elections in this article is limited to general elections,
the main locus of serious challenges to incumbent judges. Because of the absence of partisan
affiliations on the ballot, partisan primaries resemble nonpartisan elections in the structure of
the choice that voters face. In states that use nonpartisan elections, primary and general election
ballots offer the same information to voters; the biggest difference between the two stages is
that a primary ballot can include more than two candidates. Retention elections involve only
one stage of decision, typically coinciding with the general election for other offices.
37 Designation of incumbency is indicated by statutory mandate in California, Georgia,
and Oregon. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13107(2) (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-285 (1998);
OR. REV. STAT. § 254.125(2)(b) (1998). There may be other states in which incumbency
information is not mandated by statute but nonetheless is included on the ballot. California
allows all candidates to designate their "principal professions, vocations, or occupations" in
"no more than three words"; incumbents may choose this option rather than labeling
themselves as incumbents. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13107(3) (West 2002).
38 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-613 (1993); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-13(dX2) (Michie 1999).
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was never aware of their candidacies. Once informed of their identities, however,
the voter may call to mind impressions of one or both candidates. If these
impressions are based on meaningful information, the voter's belated choice may
be well-informed-and this may be true even if the voter cannot recall the
information on which these pre-existing impressions are based.39
Of course, pre-existing impressions are not necessarily based on meaningful
information. When campaigns and the media provide little information to voters,
it is especially likely that such impressions are based on a shallow pool of
information. Moreover, candidates' names can create new impressions that have
no basis in prior information about the candidates. For instance, one candidate's
name may have a vaguely positive or negative connotation for a voter. In Texas,
one candidate for the state Supreme Court with dubious qualifications was
elected on the basis of a surname that was similar to the names of two well-
known politicians, while another candidate named Gene Kelly won a supreme
court primary as an underdog.40
A name supplies other information to voters, indicating (albeit imperfectly)
the candidate's ethnicity and gender. For voters who are positively or negatively
inclined toward women as public officials, to take one example, this information
may be quite relevant to their choices.41 Studies of judicial elections have found
39 See Milton Lodge, Toward a Procedural Model of Candidate Evaluation, in POLITICAL
JUDGMENT: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS III (Milton Lodge & Kathleen M. McGraw eds.,
1995); Milton Lodge et al., An Impression-Driven Model of Candidate Evaluation, 83 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 399, 411-17 (1989); Milton Lodge et al., The Responsive Voter: Campaign
Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 309, 321-22
(1995).
Thus, we should not infer too much from the reasons that voters provide (or fail to
provide) for their choices. Voters who are asked the reasons for their votes in Ohio Supreme
Court contests typically do not supply reasons that reflect substantial information. Marie
Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial Candidates: How Voters Explain Their
Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300, 303-08 (1992). In all likelihood, the great majority of voters
who could not provide substantial reasons never assimilated much information about the
candidates. But some of those voters undoubtedly formed meaningful impressions of the
candidates on the basis of information that they had forgotten by the time of a post-election
survey about their votes.
40 Champagne & Thielemann, supra note 34, at 271; see also PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM
BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 82, 89 (1980)
(discussing the effects of familiar names in Ohio and Arizona); Anthony Champagne & Kyle
Cheek, The Cycle of Judicial Elections: Texas as a Case Study, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907,
926-27 (2002) (discussing the role of names in Texas judicial politics).
41 See Kira Sanbonmatsu, Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 20,
22-23 (2002). Identification of a candidate as a woman may also trigger impressions of other
attributes, including the candidate's ideological position (with women believed to be relatively
liberal). Jeffrey W. Koch, Gender Stereotypes and Citizens'Impressions of House Candidates'
Ideological Orientations, 46 AM. J. POL. SC. 453,453-54 (2002).
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that candidates' gender affects their overall share of the vote42 and that individual
voters may base their choice heavily on gender.43 Politicians and candidates
themselves widely believe that voters react to a candidate's ethnicity.44
In many states, the ballot provides no information on judicial candidates
other than their names.45 Where it does provide additional information, that
information can play into voters' decisions in significant ways. Identification of
the candidates' places of residence might trigger "friends and neighbors" voting,
in which candidates do best in areas near their homes.46 The one study that
investigated this possibility found that the triggering effect did not occur,47 but
this finding should not be taken as definitive.
Certainly, identification of a candidate as the incumbent may be highly
salient to voters. One study indicated that California voters reacted favorably to
an indication ofjudicial experience.4 8 Incumbency in itself serves as a positive or
negative cue for some voters. Survey-based experimental studies of the impact of
42 Philip L. Dubois, Voting Cues in Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections: A Multivariate
Assessment, 18 LAW& SOC'Y REV. 395, 419 (1984).
43 Baum, supra note 4, at 34-35.
44 For instance, Irish ancestry is thought to be an advantage in Chicago. This belief was
illustrated by the decision of a 1998 judicial candidate to adopt a middle name, so that she
appeared on the ballot as Bonnie Fitzgerald McGrath. Michael Miner, The Game of the Name,
CHI. READER, Feb. 27, 1998, § 1, at 4.
45 This is the most common ballot form in nonpartisan contests, widely used for elections
to local offices and used for some state offices in the United States. See Gerald Pomper, Ethnic
and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections, 30 PUB. OPINION Q. 79 (1966)
(discussing voting behavior in nonpartisan contests). See generally Carol Cassel, The
Nonpartisan Ballot in the United States, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES 226-41 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds., 1986); Brian F. Schaffner et
al., Teams Without Uniforms: The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections, 54 POL.
RES. Q. 7 (2001); sources cited supra note 27.
46 A number of election studies have documented the existence of "friends and
neighbors" voting. See, e.g., Tom W. Rice & Alisa A. Macht, Friends and Neighbors Voting in
Statewide General Elections, 31 AM. J. POL. SC]. 448 (1987); Raymond Tatalovich, "Friends
and Neighbors" Voting: Mississippi, 1943-73, 37 J. POL. 807 (1975). A study of judicial
retention elections in five states found a friends-and-neighbors effect for appellate judges but
not for trial judges. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Friends and Neighbors Voting in
Judicial Retention Elections: A Research Note Comparing Trial and Appellate Court
Elections, 42 W. POL. Q. 587, 589-94 (1989).
47 This study was a survey-based experiment in which some respondents were given the
cities of residence of candidates for the Ohio Supreme Court and others were not. David Klein
& Lawrence Baum, Ballot Information and Voting Decisions in Judicial Elections, 54 POL.
RES. Q. 709,716-18 (2001).
48 Dubois, supra note 42, at 419.
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disclosing incumbency on the ballot have produced mixed evidence on the
impact of this information on voters' choices.49
The ballots that voters confront in retention elections are distinctive in two
respects. They include the name of only one candidate rather than two, thus
reducing voters' ability to make use of whatever information they possess or
think they possess about candidates. By definition, these ballots indicate that
each candidate is an incumbent and structure the voter's choice in terms of a
response to the candidate's incumbency. This structuring creates a tendency for
voters to cast the same votes for or against all the judges on the same retention
ballot.50
Providing the candidates' party affiliations on the ballot has a fundamental
impact on voters' choices that is far stronger than the effect of any other ballot
information. The great majority of voters have positive or negative attitudes
toward the two major parties, and most identify with one party or the other. 51
Even in presidential contests, in which most voters know a good deal about the
candidates, voters' attitudes toward the parties are a powerful influence on their
choices.52 As the volume of other information declines, party identification is
likely to become increasingly important as a basis for choices between
candidates. 53 In judicial contests conducted with a partisan ballot, attitudes
49 Klein & Baum, supra note 47, at 716-18; David Klein & Lawrence Baum, Ballot
Forms and Vote Choice in Judicial Elections 18-21 (Jan. 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
50 Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1988, 83 JUDICATURE 79,
80-81 (1999). A survey of Wyoming voters in 1980 found a strong tendency to vote the same
way on the two supreme court justices who faced retention votes and a very strong tendency to
offer the same reasons for votes on the two justices. Kenyon N. Griffin & Michael J. Horan,
Patterns of Voting Behavior in Judicial Retention Elections for Supreme Court Justices in
Wyoming, 67 JUDICATURE 68, 70-75 (1983).
51 See HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN
POLITICS 2001-2002, at 114 (2001).
52 WILLIAM H. FLANIGAN & NANCY H. ZINGALE, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN
ELECTORATE 69-70 (9th ed. 1998).
53 Studies that compare voting in presidential elections with voting for other relatively
visible offices-govemorships and the United States Congress-have produced mixed
evidence on the relative importance of voters' attitudes toward the parties as determinants of
their choices. In particular there is not a consistent pattem in which voters' party loyalties play a
more powerful role in shaping gubematorial and congressional votes than they do in shaping
presidential votes. Hinckley et al., supra note 26, at 143-45; Shaffer, supra note 26, at 13-19.
See generally GERALD C. WRIGHT, JR., ELECTORAL CHOICE IN AMERICA: IMAGE, PARTY, AND
INCUMBENCY IN STATE AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1974). Where information about the
candidates is truly scarce, as it is in most contests for judgeships, a partisan ballot voters' party
identifications are likely to be considerably more powerful than they are in elections for the
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toward the parties are almost surely the chief determinant of the vote. Just as the
various incumbents in a retention election tend to do about equally well, the same
is true of the various judicial candidates from the same party in a partisan
election.54
As a result, partisanship has fundamental effects on the outcomes of judicial
contests under the partisan ballot. The "normal vote"55 for the two parties'
judicial candidates in any district or state reflects the balance of party
identifications among people who participate in judicial contests. Thus
candidates from a party that is dominant in a state or district have a great
advantage. Similarly, candidates for statewide judgeships do better where their
party is stronger. In states with partisan ballots, one study found that the county-
level correlations between the vote shares received by parties' candidates for the
state supreme court and their candidates for governor were typically quite high.56
Because attitudes toward the parties are so salient to voters, they can make a
difference even in nonpartisan elections. But their effects depend on the
proportion of voters who are aware of at least one candidate's affiliation, and in
most nonpartisan judicial elections that proportion is low.57 As a result, partisan
most visible offices. Indeed, they are probably the dominant basis for choice under most
conditions.
54 One striking example involved the contests for the Alabama Supreme Court in 2000.
The Republican candidate for chief justice was Roy Moore, a trial judge who had garnered
national publicity and a good deal of support in his home state for defying a federal court order
to remove the Ten Commandments from a wall of his courtroom. Moore defeated a very well-
funded associate justice of the supreme court in the Republican primary. See Kevin Sack, Ten
Commandments'Defender Wins Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2000, at A24. Despite his uniquely
high visibility Judge Moore won the general election with 54.7% of the vote (excluding write-
ins), a figure that was within 2.1% of the proportions obtained by the three Republican
candidates for associate justice positions who faced Democratic opposition. General election
results were obtained from the Alabama Secretary of State's website at
http://www.sos.state.al.us/downloads/election/2000/general/2000g-general.pdf (last visited
Dec. 12, 2002). Of course, it is possible that this result was coincidental-that it resulted from a
close balance between the number of voters who broke from party ranks to vote for Judge
Moore and those who did so to vote against him.
55 See Philip E. Converse, The Concept of a Normal Vote, in ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL.,
ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 9 (1966).
56 In other words, to take one example, counties in which the Democratic gubernatorial
candidate did best tended to be those in which the Democratic candidates for the supreme court
also did best. DUBOIS, supra note 40, at 70-92. A more recent study found a similar effect over
time in Texas. L. Douglas Kiel et al., Two-Party Competition and Trial Court Elections in
Texas, 77 JUDICATURE 290, 292 (1994).
57 Voters who do not know the candidates' party affiliations can attempt to infer those
affiliations from candidates' names, and this behavior appears to be reasonably common
among voters in at least some states that use the nonpartisan ballot. DUBOIS, supra note 40, at
81-92.
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elections structure the vote more firmly along partisan lines. The most direct
evidence of this effect came in a study of the Ohio Supreme Court elections of
1998. In pre-election and post-election surveys, some respondents were simply
given the candidates' names (as the Ohio ballot does in judicial contests), while
others were supplied the candidates' party affiliations as well. Providing party
affiliations substantially increased the tendency of voters to support the candidate
who shared their own affiliation. 58 In states with nonpartisan ballots, the county-
level correlations between the vote shares of a party's judicial and gubernatorial
candidates were considerably weaker and more variable than in partisan states.59
Of course, judicial elections are not homogeneous in the information that is
available to voters and that the average voter takes to the polling place. One
question is how contests for different levels of judgeships compare. We lack
systematic data about voter information across levels, so any comparison at this
point must be speculative.
IV. THE FATES OF INCUMBENTS
What we know about voters in judicial elections can be applied to the
situations of incumbent judges as well as the impact of higher-profile judicial
campaigns on incumbents. It appears that under ordinary conditions, incumbent
judges hold a series of ad ,antages in electoral contests. Although judges
typically enjoy much lower name recognition than the holders of offices such as
senator and governor, they are likely to begin the campaign with greater
recognition than their opponents.60 Like other incumbents, they tend to have
more campaign money to spend than their opponents. 61 Among other things,
higher spending typically enhances an incumbent's lead in name recognition. All
58 It is interesting that most of the change resulting from providing the candidates'
affiliations was from abstention to support for the candidate of the voter's party. Klein &
Baum, supra note 47, at 723-24.
One study of retention elections found mixed evidence on the impact of information
related to judges' party affiliations. In a survey prior to the elections for the California Supreme
Court in 1982, some voters were told the name of the governor who had appointed an
incumbent, while others were not; in two of the four contests, this information increased the
role of voters' party identifications in determining their votes. Peverill Squire & Eric R. A. N.
Smith, The Effect of Partisan Information on Voters in Nonpartisan Elections, 50 J. POL. 169,
172 (1988).
59 DUBOIS, supra note 40, at 70-92.
60 There is very little empirical evidence on this proposition. Some mixed evidence from
two contests for the Ohio Supreme Court is presented in Baum, supra note 4, at 28.
61 See, e.g., Robert Moog, Campaign Financing for North Carolina's Appellate Courts,
76 JUDICATURE 68, 75 (1992).
[Vol. 64:13
THE VOTER'S PERSPECTIVE
else being close to equal, lawyers' groups62 and the news media can be expected
to support incumbents. In states with partisan elections, incumbents (or at least
those who have won prior elections) usually are from the majority party in their
electoral district. For their part, judges who run in retention elections benefit
from a tendency of voters to cast "yes" votes. 63
These advantages are reflected in the results of judicial contests. In the
period from 1980 through 1995, 92% of state supreme court justices who faced
the voters were successful.64 This figure was slightly lower than the proportion
of members of the House of Representatives who won re-election. 65
Although data on the electoral fates of lower-court judges are spotty and
largely out of date, it appears that incumbents below the supreme court level fare
even better. Michigan, Ohio, and California elect judges on the nonpartisan
ballot, though Michigan and Ohio use partisan nomination procedures. From
1948 to 1968, incumbents on Michigan's trial courts of general jurisdiction won
their electoral contests 95% of the time.66 The success rate for judges on the
comparable courts in California from 1958 to 1980 was 99%.67 In the 1962 to
1980 period, previously elected judges on Ohio's general jurisdiction courts won
re-election 94% of the time.68
All of these trial court studies were carried out prior to the past two decades,
before strong campaigns against judicial incumbents became more common. But
that growth has occurred primarily at the supreme court level, so it is likely that
62 At the extreme, one study reports that "some bar associations have a policy of rating
incumbents first, and only evaluate opponents if an incumbent is not rated qualified to retain
office." SARA MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 25
(1990) (citing MILWAUKEE BAR ASS'N, LAWYERS' JUDICIAL ENDORSEMENT SYsTEM (Jan.
1989)).
63 See Aspin, supra note 50.
64 Hall, supra note 17, at 319. This figure is based on all judges who sought new terms.
Thus it includes judges in partisan and nonpartisan election states who ran unopposed.
65 The success rate for state supreme court justices was 91.7%, for House members
93.5%. Id.; see also STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 51, at 51-54 (presenting more extensive
data on success rates for congressional incumbents).
6 6 See Susan B. Hannah, Competition in Michigan's Judicial Elections: Democratic
Ideals vs. Judicial Realities, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1303 (1978) (providing the data from
which these results were calculated).
67 Dubois, supra note 42, at 399.
68 Lawrence Baum, The Electoral Fates of Incumbent Judges in the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas, 66 JUDICATURE 420,424 (1983). Appointed judges who were facing their first
elections did less well, with a success rate of about 86%. Id. at 425. That success rate is
impressive, however, for two reasons: appointed judges have a limited opportunity to achieve
name recognition during their short time in office prior to their first election, and some
appointees run in counties in which their party is a distinct minority among the voters.
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trial (and intermediate appellate) judges continue to do very well at the polls.
Research to test the accuracy of this surmise would be useful.
There are more comprehensive data on retention elections. In ten states, the
overall success rate for incumbents at all levels between 1964 and 1994 was
99%. About half of all the defeats occurred in one state, Illinois, and all but one
of the Illinois defeats resulted from the state's unique requirement of a 60%
affirmative vote for retention. The very high success rate in retention elections
applied to courts at all levels. 69
There is a general perception that judges are most vulnerable to defeat in
partisan elections and least vulnerable in retention elections. This perception
appears to be accurate. In the 1980 to 1995 period, Melinda Gann Hall found that
19% of incumbents in states with partisan elections were defeated, compared
with 9% in nonpartisan elections and 2% in retention elections. 70 Although we
do not have comparable data on elections to lower courts, it is likely that the
same pattern of differences across election systems appears in those elections.
The first requisite for defeat is opposition. In states with partisan or
nonpartisan elections, high proportions of judges run without opposing
candidates. 71 Indeed, in some states challenges to incumbents are the exception
to the rule. Of the California Superior Court judges who won re-election in the
study cited earlier, for the period from 1958 through 1980, only 6.3% had to
defeat an opponent.72 Despite subsequent changes in judicial elections,
challenges to incumbents on that court are still exceptional. For instance, among
the 142 Superior Court judges who came up for election in Los Angeles County
in 2002, only two were opposed.73 Supreme court contests are the most likely to
be contested, but in the 1980 to1995 period almost half of all incumbents across
the country ran unopposed.74
Incumbent judges are more likely to face opposition in partisan elections
than in nonpartisan elections. In the 1980 to1995 period, the proportions of
supreme court justices with challengers were 44% in states with nonpartisan
69 Aspin et al., supra note 17, at 8-12.
70 Hall, supra note 17, at 318.
71 For that matter, even seats without incumbents often have only a single aspirant on the
ballot. Ohio probably has higher proportions of contested judicial races than most other states,
but in 1998 more than half of-its races were uncontested. LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN
COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 110 (5th ed. 200 1).
72 See Dubois, supra note 42, at 399 (providing the data from which these results were
calculated).
73 Jean Guccione, Elected Judges Are a Rare Breed Indeed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at
B2.
74 Hall, supra note 17, at 317.
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elections and 61% in those with partisan elections. 75 In part, this difference
reflects the interest of party organizations in running candidates in as many
partisan contests as possible.76
Opposition does not have the same meaning in retention elections in that
voters can turn a judge out of office without an opponent's taking the initiative to
get on the ballot. In practice, however, some kind of vocal opposition is required
to defeat a judge.77 In the great preponderance of retention elections, such
opposition is lacking. One survey of judges in ten states with retention elections
found that only 13% had engaged in campaigns to retain their positions. If
Illinois is excluded, the proportion drops to 2%. Of the judges who had
campaigned, only 21% were opposed by bar associations, citizen groups, or
newspapers. 78
Of course, in retention elections voters still have a choice of affirmative or
negative votes even in the absence of visible opposition to an incumbent. In that
situation voters tend to react to their choice in terms of their general attitudes
toward government and the courts. As noted earlier, judges in a particular
electoral district typically win similar proportions of positive votes. Proportions
of positive votes fluctuate over time largely in unison with the level of trust in
government. 79
If the normal state of affairs is victory for the incumbent, defeat requires
explanation. When contests take the usual low-information form, the primary
explanation lies in unusual characteristics of information on the ballot.
75 Id.
76 Party organizations generally play a more active role at all stages of the judicial election
process in states that employ the partisan ballot. See, e.g., Patricia Kilday Hart, Disorder in the
Court, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 1988, at 118 (on Texas Supreme Court); STATE OF N.Y. COMM'N
ON GOV'T INTEGRITY, BECOMING A JUDGE: REPORT ON THE FAILINGS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
IN NEW YORK STATE 13, 23-25 (1988); FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, THE ILLUSION OF
DEMOCRACY: NEW YORK CITY CIVIL COURT ELECTIONS 1980-1985, at ix-xii (1986). This
activity may contribute to the relatively high rate of defeat for incumbents in partisan election
states, or at least those states in which party organizations regularly promote challenges to
incumbents of the other party. But the party cue on the ballot almost surely is the primary
source of that difference.
77 Illinois, with its 60% requirement, may be a partial exception.
78 It appears that the judge rather than the election is the unit of analysis for these figures,
so the rates of campaigning and opposition per election are probably somewhat lower. Larry T.
Aspin & William K. Hall, Campaigning for Retention in Illinois, 80 JUDICATURE 84 (1996);
Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE
306, 308 (1994). Aspin and Hall concluded tentatively that the initial selection of Illinois
judges in partisan elections and to a lesser degree the state's unique 60% requirement for
retention accounted for the difference between Illinois and other states. Id.
79 Aspin, supra note 50, at 79-80; Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Political Trust and
Judicial Retention Elections, 9 LAW & POL'Y 451,456 (1987).
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Sometimes a challenger enjoys a substantial advantage in name recognition and
wins for that reason alone. During the 1990s, one member of the Washington
Supreme Court lost his seat and another won by a small margin when they faced
challengers who engaged in minimal campaigns but who had attractive names.80
In 2002, Texas Supreme Court Justice Xavier Rodriguez lost to challenger
Steven Wayne Smith in the Republican primary election despite a 60-to-1
spending advantage. In Rodriguez's view, shared by most observers, Smith's
advantage was "a simpler name." 81 Challengers also can benefit from a surname
held by a popular political figure. 82
In states that employ partisan elections, incumbents may lose their seats
because of unfavorable partisan conditions. Like legislators, incumbent judges
are fairly secure in electoral districts in which their party has clear majority status
and are more vulnerable where their party is in the minority.83 For the same
reasons, incumbents become more vulnerable in election years or eras in which
their party loses strength. In the South, most notably in Texas, the Republican
resurgence in recent years has worked to the advantage of Republican candidates
for judgeships.84 One sign of this effect is the substantial number of southern
80 William S. Bailey, Time to Change the Way We Pick Judges, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 28,
1994, at B7; Robb London, For Want of Recognition, Chief Justice Is Ousted, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1990, at B 16.
81 John Council & Mary Alice Robbins, Name of the Game: Smith Upsets X-Rod in
Shocking High Court Republican Primary, TEX. LAW., Mar. 18, 2002, at 1, 1; see also Janet
Elliott, Election 2000: Fund Disparity No Advantage in Court Case, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar.
14, 2002, at A38. It may have been that, just as some voters infer that female candidates are
relatively liberal, see supra note 41, some conservative Republican voters inferred that a Latino
candidate was less conservative than an Anglo candidate and chose Smith on that basis.
82 See, e.g., Stephen Hudak, Democrat with Name Zaps Court Incumbent, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland, Ohio), Nov. 9, 2000, at I B (discussing election for the Ohio Domestic Relations
Court).
Of course, the advantages of attractive and familiar names extend to contests without
incumbents. See, e.g., Editorial, Voter Education Key in Judicial Races, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Mar. 17, 2002, at H2 (reporting on 2002 Texas judicial primaries).
83 This effect occurs even in Ohio's "semi-partisan" system. A study of elections to the
Ohio Court of Common Pleas, the trial court of general jurisdiction, in the 1962 to 1980 period
found that Republican incumbents did about equally well in more Democratic and more
Republican counties, but Democrats were far more likely to lose in Republican counties. For
appointed incumbents who were facing the voters for the first time, the partisan makeup of a
county made a substantial difference for incumbents of both parties. Baum, supra note 68, at
427-28. Had Ohio used a partisan ballot along with its partisan primary election, the impact of
county partisan strength undoubtedly would have been even stronger.
84 Kiel et al., supra note 56. After his defeat in the 1996 election, a Democratic judge in
Texas said, "I don't think a Democrat, in the next four years, is going to have a snowball's
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Democratic judges who have switched parties in efforts to keep their seats.85 An
unfavorable partisan balance is most likely to be problematic for appointees who
face their :first elections, because governors usually appoint party colleagues to
judgeships even in areas where their party is weak.
Even taking these difficulties into account, incumbent judges generally
benefit if their electoral contests take the standard low-information format. If
voters know little about the candidates, and the incumbent holds the usual
advantages in name recognition and other conditions, the odds strongly favor re-
election. Thus challengers usually have the best chance of winning when they
and their supporters can elevate the level of information available to voters,
providing them with reasons to vote against the incumbent.
In small communities or counties, that mission can be achieved by word of
mouth. Indeed, incumbents whose performance on the bench raises questions
may be especially vulnerable in rural areas where information about government
officials spreads most rapidly.86 Elsewhere, success in communicating reasons to
vote against incumbents usually requires effective access to the mass media.
Achieving this access requires either that media organizations disseminate the
negative message in news stories and editorials87 or that opponents pay for media
coverage themselves.
chance of beating a Republican" in a statewide contest. Judge Not, TEX. OBSERVER, Nov. 22,
1996, at 32.
85 Stephen J. Adler, The Texas Bench: Anything Goes, AM. LAW., Apr. 1986, at 14; David
Maraniss, In Wright's Texas, Alliances Are Shifting, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1989, at A3; Sue
Anne Pressley, Texas GOP Spotlights Party-Switchers, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1997, at A6;
Kevin Sack, G.O.P Drive Spreads as J0 Alabama Judges Jump Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
1996, at A14.
86 See Paul Raymond & Peter Paluch, The American Voter in a Local, Judicial Election
(1994) (paper presented at annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in
Chicago) (on file with author) (analyzing two models of voting behavior in a local, judicial
election based on data from a rural New York area).
87 A vivid example of the role of the media as entrepreneurs in judicial campaigns
occurred in Orange County, California, in 2002. David Haldane, Write-In Rivals of Kline Face
Tall Order, L.A. TIMES (Orange County ed.), Feb. 28, 2002, at B 1. No candidate filed to run
against an incumbent trial court judge in a nonpartisan primary election. Id. After the filing
deadline the judge was charged with child molesting and possession of child pornography. Id.
Several candidates sought to win write-in votes, and the local news media heavily publicized
the charges and the write-ins. Id. Ultimately 67% of the primary election vote went to the write-
in candidates, one of whom received slightly more votes than the incumbent. Jack Leonard,
Write-In Candidate's Tally Tops Kline's, L.A. TIMES (Orange County ed.), Mar. 22, 2002, at
B1. Because no candidate had won a majority, the incumbent and the leading challenger would
compete in the general election. Id. Facing certain defeat in the general election, the incumbent
withdrew his candidacy. Yaffe Allows Embattled Judge to Withdraw Re-Election Bid,
METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (L.A.), June 21, 2002, at 1, http://www.metnews.com/
articles/ klin062102.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
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Even when the media provide free coverage to opponents of incumbents,
they are usually responding to campaigns against an incumbent. The greater the
scale of opposition campaigns, the more likely they are to attract media attention.
Thus money is the most important key to the effectiveness of campaigns to defeat
sitting judges. For this reason the growth in the general level of spending in
judicial campaigns over the past two decades is a development of considerable
importance. 88
The sources of funding for judicial campaigns are the standard ones:
candidates themselves, individuals with whom they have some kind of
association, political parties, 89 and interest groups with a strong stake in court
policies. The last category has emerged as increasingly important in recent years,
and it is the key source of the growth in judicial campaign spending.90
The interest groups involved are primarily groups whose stakes in court
decisions are economic: business, labor, and professional groups, and the
segments of the bar that represent their interests.91 Symbolizing this development
is the recent financial participation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in judicial
campaigns. 92 Increasingly, interest groups have conducted their own campaigns
88 See Roy A. Schotland, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1489, 1493-94 (2001); see also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 7-8 (presenting evidence
on spending in judicial campaigns); Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing:
Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57,
59-60 (1985) (same); Kyle Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Money in Texas Supreme Court
Elections, 84 JUDICATURE 20, 22 (2000); James Eisenstein, Financing Pennsylvania's Supreme
Court Candidates, 84 JUDICATURE 10, 12-18 (2000); Moog, supra note 61 (discussing trends
in North Carolina); Marlene Arnold Nicholson & Norman Nicholson, Funding Judicial
Campaigns in Illinois, 77 JUDICATURE 294, 294-95 (1994).
89 The roles of the parties in funding campaigns are put in the context of other
developments in judicial elections in Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial
Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1411 (2001).
90 Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1391 (2001); Sheila Kaplan, Justice for Sale, COMMON CAUSE MAG., May/June 1987, at 29;
Sheila Kaplan & Zod Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, THE NATION, Jan. 26, 1998, at 11;
see also Anthony Champagne & Kyle Cheek, PACs and Judicial Politics in Texas, 80
JUDICATURE 26 (1996) (discussing contributions to candidates by political action committees in
Texas); Traciel V. Reid, PAC Participation in North Carolina Supreme Court Elections, 80
JUDICATURE 21 (1996) (discussing same in North Carolina).
91 See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Rubber Stamp Is Gone in Texas Judicial Election, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1988, at B7.
9 2 MARK KOZLOWSKI, REGULATING INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
1-4 (2002), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/jiseries/jiseriesl.pdf (last
visited Dec. 12, 2002); William Glaberson, US. Chamber Will Promote Business Views in
Court Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, at A24. The involvement of the Chamber and other
business groups in judicial contests is discussed in John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by
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independent of the candidates they support. The independence of campaigns
against incumbents is automatic in retention elections, where there is no
opposition candidate.
What has caused the growth of interest-group participation in judicial
campaigns? The key factor is probably contagion: when some groups seemed to
achieve success in defeating judges, other groups on the same side of interest-
group conflicts picked up the idea, and groups on the opposing side mobilized to
counteract the influence they observed. This development has concentrated on
state supreme courts, reflecting the relatively high stakes that groups perceive in
decisions of the highest state courts and the more visible activism of state
supreme courts since the 1970s.93
The messages presented by opponents of sitting judges can take a variety of
forms.94 The most common form is standard campaign appeals with little
Changing the Players: The Environmental Issue in State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 217, 235 (2001).
93 See Lawrence Baum, Supreme Courts in the Policy Process, in THE STATE OF THE
STATES 143 (Carl E. Van Hom ed., 3d ed. 1996).
941 focus on opponents' messages for two reasons. First, because incumbents typically
start out with an advantage, opponents must do something to overcome that advantage. Second,
criticism of incumbents has more direct implications for judicial independence.
Of course, incumbents conduct their own campaigns, and they or their supporters can
attack challengers in the same ways that opponents attack incumbents, especially if the
challengers also have served as judges. For instance, in a contest for the Michigan Supreme
Court in 2000, the state Republican Party aired a commercial accusing the challenger-a court
of appeals judge-of being soft on crime. The commercial focused on a case involving child
molestation and, according to one contemporary account, "shows [the judge's] name and the
word 'pedophile' on the screen at almost the same time." Kathy Barks Hoffman, High-Stakes
Supreme Court Races Become Nasty, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 21, 2000, http://www.detnews.com/
2000/politics/0010/21/politics-137221 .htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2002).
In another example, an Alabama Supreme Court justice ran a commercial that made
several strong personal attacks on his challenger in the 1996 election. Editorial, Enforce the
Rules: Ingram Ignored Ethical Canons, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Nov. 9, 1996, at 12A.
The challenger won by a narrow margin. As an associate justice, four years later, he ran for
chiefjustice and issued an attack against his trial-judge opponent that resulted in an accusation
by the state Judicial Inquiry Commission that his advertising was false and misleading. George
Lardner Jr., Speech Rights and Ethics Disputed in Judicial Races, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2000, at
A13; see also Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
That the victim of seemingly unfair campaign attacks should become the alleged perpetrator of
such attacks symbolizes the growth in hard-hitting campaign appeals both for and against
judicial incumbents.
A final example, from a trial court contest in California, involved an incumbent judge who
mailed a campaign brochure attacking her opponent for representing a defendant who was
accused of murdering a deputy sheriff. As described in a newspaper story, "[t]he cover of
Gray's four-page mailer depicted a police officer with the phrase 'Cop Killer' in large print at
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substantive content, appeals that may achieve high positive name recognition for
the challenger in a contested election. Less often, opponents raise questions
about a judge's qualifications or off-the-bench behavior. But most controversial
and most relevant to issues of judicial independence are messages related to
issues of legal policy.
Legal policy messages are controversial chiefly because of the widespread
belief that it is illegitimate for judicial candidates to take positions on issues they
could address in future cases. That belief has been reflected in state codes of
judicial conduct. Most states that elect judges adopted a provision in the 1990
Model Code of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association, a provision
that prohibits candidates for judgeships from making "statements that commit or
appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that
are likely to come before the court"; other states adopted provisions with
different language but a similar purpose. 95 But judicial candidates sometimes
evaded or directly flouted these rules. Moreover, participants in judicial elections
other than candidates were not bound by them. This was one attraction to interest
groups (and to political parties) of running independent campaigns in judicial
elections, and these independent campaigns were especially likely to raise issues
of legal policy.96
The Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White97
largely invalidated state laws that prohibit discussion of judicial issues by
candidates for judgeships. Even if most judicial candidates refrain from using the
freedom that the White decision gives them, undoubtedly the decision will
increase the frequency with which candidates state explicitly how they stand on
issues. In the process, it will facilitate issue-based attacks on incumbents by
challengers.
Among the judicial issues that opponents can raise against sitting judges,
criminal justice stands in a unique place. Crime is a highly salient issue.
Moreover, voters typically perceive the courts as too lenient in dealing with
criminal defendants. When asked whether "the courts in this area deal too
harshly or not harshly enough with criminals," the overwhelming majority of
the bottom of the page. 'Now Elliot Daum wants you to elect him judge,' it added." Pamela J.
Podger, Judge Probed over Tactics in Campaign, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 4, 2001, at A 13.
95 Brief for the Petitioners Republican Party of Minnesota et al. at 28 n.3 I, Republican
Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 534 U.S. 1054 (2002) (No. 01-251).
96 In 2000, according to one study, 18% of the television commercials sponsored by
candidates attacked the candidate's opponent, while another 8% compared the two candidates.
The comparable figures for party-sponsored commercials were 27% and 57%, respectively. For
interest group-sponsored commercials, the proportions were 80% and 10%, respectively.
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 17. Undoubtedly, a substantial proportion of the "attack"
commercials addressed policy issues.
97 563 U.S. 765 (2002).
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survey respondents chose the "not harshly enough" option (68%, versus 8%
responding "too harshly," in 2000). This is a striking finding in an era of
increasing severity in sentencing and declining crime rates.98
In this climate of opinion, creating the impression that a judge is soft on
crime can have great electoral impact.99 Convincing voters that a judge is
unwilling to impose or uphold death sentences is uniquely effective because
capital punishment is especially salient and easy to understand. These conditions
are reflected in the success of some opposition campaigns based on the death
penalty. The prototype was seen in California in 1986, when the chief justice and
two associate justices of the state supreme court were defeated by campaigns
engineered by conservative groups focusing on the death penalty.100
Some opposition campaigns focus on other criminal justice issues. A
Chicago trial judge lost a retention election in 1986 after a police campaign
spurred by his acquittal of a defendant who allegedly had assaulted a police
officer.' 0 1 A Nebraska Supreme Court justice was defeated in 1996 partly on the
basis of his interpretation of a second-degree murder statute.10 2 One memorable
newspaper advertisement charged that a California municipal judge had never
sentenced a defendant to prison, neglecting to add that municipal judges had no
power to issue prison sentences.10 3
98 The margin in favor of the view that the courts were insufficiently harsh has narrowed
somewhat, perhaps due to declining crime rates and increasing court severity. The margin had
been 85% to 3% in 1994. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000, 139
(Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001) (presenting survey data).
99 Of course, sitting judges and their supporters can also proclaim their conservatism in
criminal justice to defend themselves against actual or potential attacks or simply to appeal to
voters. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 191 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751-52 (S.D. Miss.
2000) (describing such advertisements).
100 John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The
Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 353-
54 (1987); see also Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Judicial Retention Elections: The
Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, in RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 1999, at 41,49-
52 (2000) (describing campaigns in which the incumbent's position on the death penalty was a
basis for opposition in Nebraska and Tennessee); Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The
Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 797, 846-47 (1986) (discussing same in the 1980s).
101 Charles Mount, Judge Taken off Bench by Voters Makes Bid to Return, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 15, 1988, § 1, at 5.
102 Reid, supra note 100, at 52-55.
103 Gail Diane Cox, Jerry's Judges, NAT'L L.J., May 25, 1992, at 30; see also David M.
Jones, Ideology & Judicial Elections in Wisconsin, COMP. ST. POL., Aug. 1989, at 6, 6-7
(discussing a Wisconsin Supreme Court contest in which criminal justice issues were raised
against the incumbent).
2003]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
To a much lesser degree, opposition groups use other social issues that are
very important to some voters. Conservative groups, for instance, have employed
issues such as abortion and gun control, sometimes in conjunction with criminal
justice issues. 104 But the division of voter opinion on these issues reduces their
efficacy in most states.
Most interesting are the economic issues that provide the primary motivation
for large-scale campaigns against incumbents by interest groups.10 5 With a
widespread perception of a litigation explosion and of courts that are unduly
sympathetic to personal injury plaintiffs, business and professional groups seem
to have a potent issue to use against liberal judges. Indeed, some campaigns
emphasize this issue. 106 But opinion on this issue is divided, and it is not nearly
as salient as crime. Therefore economic groups often present public campaigns
104 For instance, two Florida Supreme Court justices faced opposition from conservative
groups in their retention elections in the early 1990s. Along with criminal justice, abortion was
an issue in both opposition campaigns and gun control in one. See Andrew Blum, Jurists,
Initiatives on Ballot, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16, 1992, at 1, 31; Karen Branch, Politics and Florida's
Highest Court, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 1, 1992, at 6M; State's Chief Justice Keeps His Seat,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 1990, at 17A. Both candidates won retention. In 1998, two California
Supreme Court justices easily won retention after a small-scale opposition campaign based on
their votes to strike down a statute requiring parental consent for abortions. Gail Diane Cox,
Ouster of Two Calif Justices Sought, NAT'L L.J., June 29, 1998, at A8; Supreme Court
Justices Handily Win New Terms, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 4, 1998, at A27. In 2001, an Idaho
Supreme Court justice was defeated by conservative groups who attacked her position on water
rights and raised other social issues. Echeverria, supra note 92, at 238-54; William Glaberson,
supra note I.
In a 1998 contest for the Georgia Supreme Court, the challenger put out a brochure
charging that the incumbent "would require the State to license same-sex marriages,"."referred
to traditional moral standards as 'pathetic and disgraceful,'" and "called the electric chair
'silly.' " Weaver v. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2000). A revised brochure
and television commercial made similar charges. Id. The incumbent was re-elected by a large
margin. ld.; see also Champagne, supra note 90, at 1405-06 (discussing several examples of
campaigns involving issues other than criminal justice).
105 The role of economic issues as a source of growth in the scale of judicial campaigns is
illustrated by the detailed discussion of developments in Champagne & Cheek, supra note 40
(Texas), and Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 645, 656-61 (1999) (Alabama).
106 An example was evident in the campaigns for the Michigan Supreme Court in 2000,
in which the issues ranged widely but economic issues were especially prominent. See Charlie
Cain, High Court Race Will be Nasty, Pricey, DETROIT NEWS, June 23, 2000, at 1; Jim Irwin,
Michigan Voters Have Last Word in Bitter Supreme Court Race, ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE &




that focus on judges' qualifications' 0 7 or on criminal justice issues108 rather than
on the economic issues that motivated the groups' participation in judicial
contests. 109
We lack a clear picture of the frequency of success and failure for efforts to
defeat incumbent judges that are motivated by their decisions. Nor has there been
a systematic study of the conditions that determine the chances for success. What
we do know about voters in judicial contests, however, provides a perspective
from which to think about the effectiveness of this type of anti-incumbent
campaign.
The key fact is that voters' usual inattention to contests for judgeships
creates both a challenge and an opportunity for opponents of incumbents. The
challenge is to reach voters with reasons to vote against the incumbent. Even
with the recent growth in the funding of judicial campaigns, the level of spending
on behalf of most challengers is insufficient to capture the attention and influence
the decisions of most voters. Of course, influencing even a relatively small
107 In some ways the classic example of such a campaign was the defeat of Ohio Chief
Justice Frank Celebrezze in 1986. Celebrezze had led the Ohio Supreme Court in a markedly
liberal direction on issues in tort law, and economic interest groups worked hard to defeat him.
But the campaign against him emphasized allegations about his conduct as chief justice, and it
was those allegations that resulted in his defeat. G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS
PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 172-76 (1988); Hojnacki & Baum,
supra note 39.
108 One example was a 1996 campaign for the Georgia Court of Appeals in which the
challenger attacked the incumbent for an opinion that had reversed the conviction of a
confessed child molester. One commentator noted that "the personal injury lawyers who
bankrolled [the challenger's] advertising campaign ... were not really mad at Judge Andrews
for coddling a child molester. They were mad at him for coddling insurance companies." Stuart
Taylor Jr., Campaigning for the Bench, LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 1996, at 21. The successful
efforts to defeat three California Supreme Court justices arguably fit into this category as well.
See Wold & Culver, supra note 100. But see Roy A. Schotland, Introduction: Personal Views,
34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1361, 1362 n.4 (2001) (arguing that conservative economic groups
played a limited role in funding the campaign to defeat the California justices).
109 Straddling the line between qualifications and economic issues are campaigns in
which the incumbent is attacked for alleged improper behavior that is related to economic
issues. Two Ohio campaigns against the same incumbent supreme court justice, Alice Robie
Resnick, attacked her for receiving contributions from personal injury lawyers. A 1994
commercial "featured a mock $300,000 check [to the incumbent] from the law firm of 'Sue &
Sue,' signed by 'Cheatem Good'." James Bradshaw, Judge Reprimanded Over '94 Election
Ad, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 7, 1996, at ID. Six years later, business groups funded a
commercial against Resnick in which "a blindfolded justice statue... peeks at a pile of money
on her scales. The ad says Resnick received $750,000 in campaign contributions from trial
lawyers and asks, 'Is justice for sale in Ohio?' " Darrel Rowland & James Bradshaw, State
Elections Panel Reaffirms Legality of Anti-Resnick TV Ad, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 27,
2000, at Dl 0. Resnick won both elections.
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minority of voters may be sufficient to change the outcome of a judicial contest.
However, incumbents, who typically begin the campaign with a substantial
advantage, often can withstand the loss of some voter support.
The opportunity lies in the shallow roots of most voters' predilections in
judicial contests. Voters inclined to support the incumbent usually lack strong
reasons for that inclination. If the incumbent's opponents can communicate
strong reasons to vote for a challenger or against retention, they may achieve
considerable influence. For example, convincing a high proportion of voters that
a judge is soft on crime can be sufficient to defeat that judge. For that matter,
even non-substantive considerations can threaten a judge's tenure. In states that
employ nonpartisan elections, finding a challenger with a pleasantly familiar
name might be the most effective step for an interest group that seeks to defeat an
incumbent. Boosting a challenger's name recognition with heavy advertising that
lacks much content is a valuable step as well.
In recent years it has become clear that spending very large sums of money
to defeat incumbents is not enough to ensure success. The failures of some well-
funded challenges to state supreme court justices in 20001 10 highlight that reality.
Voters may find proffered reasons to remove a judge from office insufficiently
credible or significant to guide their vote. Further, an effective campaign in
support of an incumbent can neutralize the impact of an opposition campaign,
even if the opposition spends more money. In this context and in general, voters
should not be regarded as passive recipients of campaign messages.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVIDENCE
As the survey of evidence in this article indicates, we have an incomplete
picture of judicial elections in practice. As a result, we also have an incomplete
picture of the relationship between the election process and judicial
independence. Still, some tentative conclusions are possible.
Today, as in the past, most judicial elections are relatively quiet. Compared
with the contests at the top of the ballot, contests for judgeships typically provide
very limited information to voters. Lacking much information, voters frequently
decline to choose between judicial candidates. When they do make a choice, they
base that choice on the scraps of information they do hold, primarily the
information they can glean from the ballot.
On the whole, this situation favors incumbents. They usually enjoy at least a
mild advantage over their opponents in name recognition prior to the campaign,
and they can usually spend more money than their opponents to extend that
110 See Mills & Waddle, supra note 35 (Mississippi); T.C. Brown, Resnick Overcomes
Attacks, Wins High Court Race, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Nov. 8, 2000, at IA (Ohio);
Irwin, supra note 106 (Michigan).
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advantage during the campaign. In states that employ partisan ballots, most
incumbents have the advantage of majority-party status in their counties or other
election districts. In states that use retention elections, the voters who are inclined
to vote against any incumbent are greatly outnumbered by those inclined to cast
affirmative votes. Incumbents' advantages discourage challengers in partisan and
nonpartisan elections, combining with other forces to produce a high rate of
default victories for sitting judges.
The low-information character of most judicial contests does leave some
incumbents vulnerable to defeat. In states that employ partisan elections, a
Republican may lose a judgeship simply because a county leans Democratic, and
a good Republican year in a state may sweep out some Democratic judges. In
states with nonpartisan elections, when the challenger enjoys an advantage in
name recognition, an incumbent may lose even in the absence of a significant
opposition campaign. These instances, though, are clearly exceptions to the rule.
The proportion of judicial contests that depart from the low-information
model surely has increased over the past two decades, though the extent of this
growth is uncertain. It has been concentrated at the state supreme court level and
has been sufficiently widespread at that level to constitute a significant trend.
There may be a similar trend in lower level courts, but it does not appear to be
nearly as strong. For instance, contests for intermediate appellate judgeships,
ordinarily the least visible of all court levels, seem to have changed relatively
little.II'
Has judicial independence declined? For state supreme court justices, almost
certainly it has. Justices are now more likely to face strong opposition campaigns
that are based in large part on their judicial votes and opinions. Primarily in
criminal justice and secondarily on other economic and social issues, justices
face a greater risk of paying an electoral price for the positions they take in cases.
To a lesser degree the same development has occurred in contests for trial court
judgeships.
The effect of this trend on judges' perceptions of their independence
undoubtedly is substantial. Large-scale campaigns against incumbent judges that
achieve success or come close to it are vivid events. Like other vivid events, they
are likely to be exaggerated by observers---especially observers to whom they are
quite relevant.1 12 Thus it is not surprising that state judges have expressed great
concern about their vulnerability to defeat on the basis of their decisions. 11 3
111 This judgment should be regarded as quite tentative, pending systematic analysis of
contests for intermediate appellate judgeships.
1 12 See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 43-62 (1980) (on vividness and perceptions of reality).
113 The classic statement was by Otto Kaus, former member of the California Supreme
Court: '"here's no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political consequences of
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People concemed with the selection of judges have devoted a good deal of
attention to formal rules for judicial elections, in the belief that those rules have
considerable effect in practice. That belief is accurate. Voters respond in
different ways to partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, and retention
elections. Primarily for that reason, 114 incumbent judges are most vulnerable to
defeat in partisan elections and safest in retention elections. On the whole, this
means that elections pose the greatest challenge to judicial independence in states
that use the partisan ballot and the most limited challenge in states with retention
elections: when judges are most likely to lose, they are also most likely to lose as
a result of opposition to their decisions.
But this is only a tendency. Issue-based campaigns against sitting judges are
hardly unknown in retention elections. The best-known success for such a
campaign-the defeat of three Califomia Supreme Court justices in 1986-came
in a retention election. 11 5 It could be argued that California is anomalous because
its retention elections are not part of a Missouri Plan system. But other issue-
based campaigns against incumbents, such as the successful campaigns against
supreme court justices in Nebraska and Tennessee in 1996116 and the nearly
successful campaigns against Florida justices in 1990 and 1992,117 came in
Missouri Plan states. In this respect, as in others, the Missouri Plan is not
immune to "politics" in its colloquial sense.118
Some people, including most judges, have a general and consistent
commitment to judicial independence. Beyond this base of support, judicial
independence is now of greatest concem to political liberals, because it is chiefly
certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make them near election time. That would be
like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub." Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 1987, at 52, 58.
114 Election rules also shape the behavior of prospective candidates, political parties, and
others who are interested in the outcomes of judicial elections. In turn, some of these effects,
such as the more substantial role of party organizations in partisan elections, help determine
election outcomes for incumbents.
115 See supra text accompanying note 100.
116 See Reid, supra note 100.
117 See supra note 104.
118 The actual operation of the prior stages of the Missouri Plan (commission nomination
and gubernatorial selection) has been documented only to a limited degree, and there is
disagreement about how large a role politics plays in these stages. See generally ALLAN
ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING
PROCESS (1974); RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH
AND THE BAR; JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN (1969);
Steven L. Willbom, Off the Mark: The Nebraska Supreme Court and Judicial Nominating
Commissions, 70 NEB. L. REV. 277 (1991); Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current




judges perceived as liberal who are vulnerable to defeat by organized
opposition. 19 It appears that conservative groups have an advantage in spending
money on judicial campaigns because of their business base, though labor unions
and trial lawyers also can raise substantial funds. The most powerful advantage
for conservative groups is not money; rather, the policy issue most likely to sway
voters, criminal justice, is one that favors conservatives. This means that the
impact of electoral pressures on judicial decisions, whatever the strength of that
impact may be, is primarily in favor of conservative positions on criminal
justice. 120
There is widespread dissatisfaction today with the operation of judicial
elections. This dissatisfaction is based largely on perceived threats to judicial
independence, though other considerations come into play. Choices about
proposed changes in the structure of election rules depend heavily on the values
of those who make those choices. Perhaps most important is an individual's view
of the appropriate balance between independence and accountability for judges.
But whatever one's values may be, assessment of proposed changes must take
into account the voter's perspective. Ultimately it is voters who determine the
outcomes and impact of judicial elections, and reforms based on an inaccurate
conception of voting in judicial contests are unlikely to achieve their intended
effects.
119 Conservative judges are sometimes challenged on the basis of their policy positions,
usually on economic issues. One example is the well-funded campaigns against three Michigan
Supreme Court justices in 2000. See Amy Lane, Business-Backed Issues Define State Court
Races, CRAN'S DETROIT Bus., Oct. 23, 2000, at 36; Irwin, supra note 106.
120 The effects of political pressures on death penalty decisions are analyzed in John
Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection:
An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465 (1999); Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence
in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117 (1987);
Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J.
POL. 427 (1992); Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial
Politics in the American States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485 (1995). The argument that these pressures
have a strong impact is presented in Stephen B. Bright, Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch:
Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123 (1999); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and
the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital
Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995).
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